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ATTENTIONAL ENGAGEMENT AS PRACTICE. 





In this paper, we investigate the attentional engagement of CEOs of large healthcare 
organizations in the UK. We study attention ethnographically as something managers do – at 
different times, in context, and in relation to others. We find that CEOs match the challenges 
of volume, fragmentation, and variety of attentional demands with a bundle of practices to 
activate attention, regulate the quantity and quality of information, stay focused over time and 
prioritize attention. We call this bundle of practices the CEO’s attentional infrastructure. The 
practices which compose the attentional infrastructure work together to ensure that CEOs 
balance paying too much with too little attention, sustain attention on multiple issues over 
time, and allocate attention to the issues that matter, while avoiding becoming swamped by 
too many other concerns. The attentional infrastructure and its component practices are 
constantly revised and adapted to match the changes in the environment and ensure that 
managers remain “on top of” the things that matter to them. The idea of a practice-based 
attentional infrastructure advances theory by expanding and articulating the concept of 
attentional engagement, a central element in the attention-based view of the firm. We also 
demonstrate the benefits of studying attention as practice, rather than as an exclusively mental 
phenomenon. Finally, we contribute to managerial practice by introducing a set of categories 
which managers can use to interrogate their existing attentional practices and address 
attentional traps and difficulties. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, we study how chief executive officers (CEOs) pay attention in practice to what is 
happening within and around their organizations. We focus specifically on how managerial attention 
is allocated, directed, and dealt with – what Ocasio (2011) calls “attentional engagement”. Attentional 
engagement is critical for all managers but is especially important for CEOs who are constantly 
bombarded by complex signals from organizational members, customers, regulators, and other 
stakeholders. Because the CEO is responsible for everything that occurs in the organization, issues 
that arise cannot be simply ignored – even though initially the CEO may not be able to judge which 
will be consequential. There is a risk that they might discover too late what should have engaged their 
attention – as happened in the case of Volkswagen’s emissions scandal (Plungis and & Hull 2015) and 
Facebook’s role in the 2016 US elections (Leonardi 2014). 
Previous research has addressed attentional engagement in terms of balancing foresight, oversight, 
and insight (Ocasio 2011, van Knippenberg et al. 2015, Shoemaker 2019). We suggest that a better 
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way to frame the issue is to refer to three challenges faced by managers: the challenge of volume of 
attentional demands, which requires finding the right balance between too little and too much 
information; the challenge of fragmentation, which involves paying sufficient attention to a multitude 
of issues at the same time without getting distracted; and the challenge of variety, which means 
focusing on the things that matter, both immediately and in the longer term. Our research question is: 
how do CEOs address these challenges in practice? 
We study attentional engagement ethnographically as something that managers do, in context, using 
tools, and with other people. We are interested in attention as practice (Feldman and Orlikowski 
2012). This approach distinguishes our study from work in the predominantly psychological tradition 
initiated by William James, which conceives attention mainly in terms of intrapsychic mental 
operations and cognitive phenomena (Calori, Johnson and Sarnin 1994, Kabanoff and Brown 2008). 
In contrast, we examine mundane activities through which managers regulate their efforts to remain 
attentionally engaged without being swamped by too many concerns, how their attentional 
engagement changes over time, and how they switch between and prioritize different attentional 
demands.  
We find that CEOs address the challenges of volume, fragmentation, and variety of attentional 
demands with a bundle of interconnected practices, which we describe as their attentional 
infrastructure. The attentional infrastructure includes practices for activating and regulating attention, 
which enable the CEOs to infer the relevant foci for attention and adjust the levels of attention 
demand allocated to them; focusing practices that help them to identify the span of attention needed 
for different topics and to sustain that attention; and prioritizing practices to actively manage and 
orient attention. Establishing and maintaining this attentional infrastructure helps the CEO to avoid 
potential pitfalls and dysfunction, such as becoming overwhelmed and taking their “eyes off the ball”, 
or missing something of critical importance, that is “finding yourself asking after the fact how could 
this happen without me knowing?” (Alan [CEO 4]). 
We use the term “attentional demands” to describe the issues that compete for the CEOs’ attention. 
These demands are in part “out there” (Bansal, Kim and Wood 2018) and in part are enacted by the 
bundle of practices utilized by the CEOs (Weick 1988). We refer to “bundles” since some of these 
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practices are tightly interconnected. The distinction we make between the three bundles of practices 
that compose the infrastructure is for mainly analytical purposes. In reality, most of these practices 
work together to produce the outcomes listed above: for example, the prioritization practices also 
work to regulate attentional demands and allow the CEOs to maintain focus, while focusing practices 
contribute also to regulation. We use the term infrastructure because the overall arrangement displays 
the characteristics identified by Star and Ruhleder (1996) as typifying such an array: it is mostly 
opaque to the CEOs; it is composed of mundane elements; although it supports the CEOs’ work, it 
can become an obstruction, by pointing in the wrong direction or becoming obsolete. Practices, 
bundles, and the overall infrastructure are “personal” because they reflect individual preferences, 
personal histories, organizational conditions, and contextual demands. Although several attentional 
practices are tied to the prerogatives and obligations associated with the CEO job, which suggests that 
attentional engagement might be role specific, there is no single best combination or infrastructure. 
Instead, attentional engagement reflects a “fit” between demands, attentional infrastructure, and the 
individual CEO’s specificities, and therefore does not allow universal prescription.   
Our study responds to recent calls to pay more attention to attention (Ocasio 2011, van Knippenberg 
et al. 2015), and examines how managers in general and CEOs in particular, pay attention on a day-to-
day basis (Ocasio 2011, p. 1292). We contribute to the attention-based view (ABV) of the firm 
(Ocasio 1997, 2011, Rerup 2009) by elaborating an in-depth understanding of attentional engagement, 
a central element of this approach. We show that much can be gained if the ABV’s traditional focus 
on communication and cognition is extended to include material, social, and contextual elements. Our 
study contributes also to managerial practice, by offering managers a set of categories they can use to 
recognize, diagnose, and address various traps and pathologies. By developing a better theoretical 
understanding of their attentional engagement, CEOs can find ways to practice “smarter attention” or 
paying attention to everything in sufficient detail to determine its importance and an appropriate 




Studying attention can be difficult since it is simultaneously familiar and difficult to demarcate. 
William James, who put attention at the core of the nascent discipline of psychology, considered it a 
common sense concept and suggested that “everyone knows what attention is” (James 1890, p. 403). 
However, this proved not to be the case. In psychology, attention is researched mainly as a cognitive 
and sensory phenomenon. In political science, attention is related closely to the notion of agendas 
(Jones and Baumgartner 2005). In economics and sociology, attention is central to the study of 
decision making (Davenport and Beck 2001). The way we define and study the phenomenon is also 
heavily dependent on the metaphor we employ to identify it. Fernandez-Duque and Johnson (1999, p. 
83) suggest that underlying metaphors (e.g. attention as a filter, a spotlight, a neurological activity) 
help to circumscribe which attentional phenomena are studied and how, and what constitutes 
evidence. What attention is and how we study it go hand in hand.  
The study of managerial attention 
In management studies, attention traditionally is considered at the individual level, often using the 
cognitive metaphor of a spotlight (Fernandez-Duque and Johnson 1999). For several decades, studies 
focused on environmental scanning: the acquisition and use of information about an organization's 
external environment for decision making (Aguilar 1967, Hambrick 1982, Choo 2001). Thus, 
attention was addressed in terms of individual oversight and foresight (Shoemaker 2018). This strand 
of research established a relationship between frequency and focus of scanning, and firm outcomes 
(Miller 1991). 
Alternatively, attention has been considered as a distinct challenge for managers. This applies to the 
managerial work tradition pioneered in Europe by Carlson (1951) and Stewart (1967, 1976), and in 
the USA by Mintzberg (1973, 2009). In this tradition, managers need enough information to make 
decisions, but have to find a balance between issues that required “concentration and depth of 
understanding” and those that required their “marginal involvement” (Mintzberg 1973, p. 179). 
Managers also have to carve out some space for managerial discretion to combat the constant flux of 
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attentional demands (Mintzberg 2009, p. 33). Their effectiveness depended in part on how well they 
coped with these challenges. 
A critical shift in the study of organizational attention was introduced by the ABV (Ocasio 1997, 
2011, Hoffman and Ocasio 2001). The ABV integrates individual and organizational levels of 
analysis and considers organizations as “systems of structurally distributed attention … in which the 
cognition and action of individuals are derived from the specific organizational context and situations 
that individual decision makers find themselves in” (Ocasio 1997, p. 198). What people pay attention 
to in organizations (what subscribers to the ABV call “attentional selection”) is the result of a 
combination of the firm’s attentional perspective, or “the cognitive and motivational structures that 
generate heightened awareness and focus on relevant stimuli and responses” (Ocasio 2011, p. 1288), 
and the attentional engagement of managers, defined as “the process of intentional, sustained 
allocation of cognitive resources to guide problem solving, planning, sense making, and decision 
making” (Ocasio 2011, p. 1287). Thus, attentional engagement refers to the critical juncture between 
the external context, strategic priorities, and organizational agendas, and managers’ individuality and 
personal histories (Kaplan 2008), which generate the managerial response, or lack thereof. Attentional 
engagement is critical to understanding managerial attention. 
Three challenges related to attentional engagement 
The study of attentional engagement, that is how managers devote time, energy, and effort to selecting 
a set of environmental stimuli and how they connect them to possible repertoires of responses (Ocasio 
1997), can be framed in terms of three challenges: volume, fragmentation and variety.  
The challenge of volume refers to the need for managers to regulate their attentional engagement to 
achieve “requisite attention” (Ashby 1956): enough attention to capture the critical variations in the 
internal and external environment without risking being overwhelmed by too much data. Failure to 
achieve requisite attention exposes the manager to the dual risk of missing relevant changes in the 
competitive landscape and information overload (Edmund and Morris 2000). Feather (1998, p. 118) 
defines information overload as so much information that it becomes impossible to use it. 
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The challenge of fragmentation refers to the need for managers to achieve the right trade-off in their 
attentional engagement between vigilance and deliberate attention. According to the ABV, attentional 
engagement involves two complementary mental mechanisms: vigilance (e.g. watching out for the 
appearance of a particular stimulus) and executive attention (e.g., deliberate, controlled, and voluntary 
focusing of attention). The first allows the individual to devote uninterrupted attention to a particular 
issue (for a limited period of time); the second allows the manager intentionally to direct attention to the 
issue, to detach from it if necessary, and to return to it when appropriate. The challenge lies in finding a 
balance between the two because effective decision making in organizations “would be impossible if 
one or the other of these two forces were missing” (Ocasio 2011, p. 1289). Because attentional 
resources are scarce, managers must adopt careful timing and sequencing to achieve this balance 
(Garg, Walters and Priem 2003, Ocasio and Wohlgezogen 2010).  
The challenge of fragmentation can thus be framed by drawing on the work of Hall (1976), who 
differentiates between mono-chronic and poly-chronic orientation to time and hence to attention. 
Individuals with a mono-chronic orientation tend to do one thing at a time without interruption, 
whereas poly-chronically oriented individuals and cultures enact multiple things at the same time and 
tend to change their plans, emphasizing social relationships over task completion and privacy. Mono-
chronicity and poly-chronicity can also be used to describe modes of attentional engagement. Mono-
focal attentional engagement implies full and undivided attention to the task at hand. Poly-focality 
implies multitasking and fragmentation. Managers are exposed continuously to the risk of becoming 
overly poly-focal. Therefore, they face the challenge of how to act mono-focally in a job that tends 
towards extreme poly-focality and fragmentation. Inability to do this can result in attention being 
spread too thinly across too many issues, and important matters being overlooked, or in managers 
appearing superficial. 
Finally, the challenge of variety refers to the need to pay attention to what managers consider to be 
important rather than succumbing to the attentional demands being put on them (Mintzberg 2009) or 
passively enacting the attentional structure of their firm or industry (Ocasio 1997). This difficulty is 
exacerbated by the fact that what top managers appear to pay attention to sends important signals to 
the rest of the organization (Ocasio 1997). Therefore, the challenges of attentional engagement are 
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related to quantity and quality over time. Managers need continuously to update their practices to 
match the evolving nature of attentional demands. Failure to do so can lead to especially senior 
managers becoming overwhelmed by the attentional demands imposed by their jobs and embedded in 
their firms’ attentional structure (Ocasio 2011). It can result also in neglect of strategic and long-term 
issues (Davenport and Beck 2001) or in the manager becoming a hostage to the daily diary 
(Mintzberg 2009, p. 33).  
Addressing the challenges 
The literature says little about how these attentional engagement challenges are handled by managers. 
Studies of environmental scanning focus on helping managers to optimize their scarce scanning 
resources (Aguilar 1967, Hambrick 1982, Choo 2001). Scholars have examined how the 
organization’s situational dimensions, organizational strategies, and managerial scanning behaviors 
are mutually influential and affect organizational outcomes. They suggest that the frequency, 
intensity, and breadth of scanning increases with increased external uncertainty (Daft, Sormunen and 
Parks 1988). However, scanning remains largely a “black box”. Following Aguilar (1967), several 
authors have tried to distinguish among information sources and between active and passive scanning. 
However, they rarely consider what this means for managers’ everyday work. 
Similarly, the managerial work research tradition tends not to theorize about how managers respond to 
these three challenges. While this stream of studies centers the attention on and articulates the nature 
of attentional challenges (Mintzberg 1973, 2009), many analyses lack richness. Descriptions of related 
activities are often thin, missing, or relegated to appendices (e.g. see Mintzberg 2009). While some 
authors highlight that attentional engagement is accomplished mostly verbally (de Alwis, Majid and 
Chaudhry 2006), making executives’ social networks critical to their effectiveness (e.g. Anderson 
2008), how this unfolds is rarely explained.   
Similarly, work in the ABV tradition rarely zooms in on the rich detail of attentional engagement. As 
a result, research on attentional engagement is less developed than work on the firm’s attentional 
perspective or attentional selection (Ocasio 2011, p. 292). For example, Ocasio and Wohlgezogen 
(2010) address the challenges of volume and variety by examining how different types of 
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organizational control affect attentional engagement. They argue that hierarchical controls over 
outcomes (objectives, budgets, deliverables) and communication channels particularly influence 
executive attention, acting as reminders if the executive becomes distracted, and filtering information. 
In contrast, behavioral and cultural controls mostly influence vigilance – they operate as selection 
rules. However, how these controls are manifested in the daily work of managers has not been 
explored. Similarly, ABV scholars have investigated the issue of fragmentation and have made a 
convincing case for the need for managers to balance vigilance and executive attention since “an actor 
cannot sustain attention firmly on a stimulus and at the same time flexibly switch back and forth 
between stimuli” (Ocasio 2011, p. 193). How this balance is achieved (or not) in practice however, 
remains largely the subject of theoretical speculation (Shepherd, McMullen and Ocasio 2017). 
In summary, while the ABV makes attentional engagement a cornerstone of its approach, it offers 
limited insights into how it might look in practice. This is perhaps because much of this work is 
conceptual (Ocasio, 1997, 2011, Levinthal and Rerup 2006, Ocasio and Wohlgezogen, 2010, 
Shepherd, McMullen and Ocasio 2016), or is based on quantitative studies (Kaplan 2008) and post 
hoc analyses (Joseph and Ocasio 2012).  
In the present paper, we address this gap and open the black box of attentional engagement by 
examining in-depth the mundane, daily ways in which vigilance is achieved, executive attention 
operates, and attention emerges as a “distributed” phenomenon.   
STUDYING ATTENTION THROUGH A PRACTICE LENS  
To develop novel insights into how CEOs pay attention requires a theoretical and methodological 
orientation that allows us to overcome the limitations imposed by the information processing tradition 
underpinning most managerial studies of attention, including those in the ABV (Ocasio 1997) and 
managerial work traditions (e.g. Mintzberg 1973, Stewart 1967, 1976). Specifically, an information-
processing approach positions attention as something that is done in and by the mind. Thus, attention 
is conceived “as one of the most fundamental tasks of the brain” (Ocasio and Wohlgezogen 2010, p. 
195) or as pertaining only to the ideational, communicative sphere (e.g. Ocasio 1997, p. 191). 
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However, this focus obscures the more concrete ways of activating, regulating, focusing, and 
prioritizing attention. Accordingly, we adopt a practice lens that allows us to examine how top 
managers address the three challenges in practice beyond only mental engagement or talk.  
Attention as practice 
The term “practice lens” refers to a family of theoretical and empirical orientations which foreground 
“social practices”, defined as routinized regimes of materially-mediated doings, sayings, knowing, 
and ways of relating that form the building blocks for understanding organizational phenomena 
(Schatzki 2005, Miettinen, Samra-Fredericks and Yanow 2010, Feldman and Orlikowski 2012, 
Nicolini 2013, Feldman and Worline 2016, Nicolini and Monteiro, 2017). This approach shares with 
Mintzberg-inspired studies of managerial work (Mintzberg 1973, 2009; Nicolini, Korica & Ruddle 
2015) a predilection for direct observation of real time action. It also demands attentiveness to social 
and material elements such as artefacts, bodies, and interactions – all notably absent in traditional 
studies of attention. Finally, practice-oriented scholars tend to be sensitive to the historical conditions 
allowing the possibility of particular practices; context matters. In our case, we use the practice lens as 
a sensitizing device, which has important consequences.  
First, a practice lens invites us to study attention as something managers do. In contrast to other 
approaches (Wu 2011), it positions attention as an embodied, social, and situated activity, rather than 
an intrapsychic phenomenon or a sensory-motor behavior. As Yoshida and Burling (2011, p. 536) put 
it, “knowing where the eyes are is not enough”.  
Second, a practice lens suggests that we should expect attention to be affected and partially structured 
by a number of ecological conditions. These include the objects that surround managers and their 
interactional order – we pay attention to people and through people (Citton 2017). Paying attention is 
affected also by multiple cultural formations and wider discourses (Gee 1990). Therefore, paying 
attention unfolds according to local and more general “attentional regimes” (Citton 2017, p. 18) – 
structures of socially upheld expectations (Jones 2005), which also must be accounted for.  
Third, in a practice perspective, to the extent that paying attention is a future-oriented activity, it ends 
only when a stimulus is connected to an action (Wu 2014). Paying attention is more than simply 
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producing material for further mental processing – it can persist until the specific concern that 
underpins it is resolved. This means that “paying attention” can last for seconds or minutes measured 
by traditional psychological experiments, or be of longer duration characteristic of organizational life 
(Bansal, Kim and Wood 2018). Therefore, we need to investigate how managers navigate between 
multi-temporal objects of attention, and choose what to pay attention to over time.  
Finally, from a practice perspective, attention is not an isolated activity, but rather a readiness 
nurtured by personal and social expectations and the search for meaning: what does this mean for me 
and my organization? It is therefore inextricably projected into the future and linked to evaluation and 
caring. As Schutz (1970, p. 316) put it, attention is always “turning toward an object, combined with 
further considerations and anticipations of its characteristics and uses”.  
In summary, the practice lens encourages the study of attention as a mundane socio-material activity, 
with a focus on its distinctive features – in this case, how top managers pay attention over time. 
Viewing attentional engagement as practice (as in the present study) also mandates that we investigate 
it in situ, rather than relying on post-hoc accounts which in this setting have been shown to be 
particularly unreliable (Fidel and Green 2004).  
RESEARCH SETTINGS AND METHODOLOGY 
To examine attentional engagement practices in depth, we conducted a two-year (2011-2013) 
ethnographic study of CEOs running complex healthcare organizations. The study involved both the 
authors, and combined shadowing and observation with interviews and document analysis. 
Research context 
Our study focused on seven CEOs of hospitals and mental health services organizations (“trusts”) in 
the English National Health Service (NHS). In effect, these are public sector corporations with a 
notable degree of formal managerial and financial independence. CEOs as accountable officers have 
both legal and financial responsibility, and the organizations are overseen at arm’s length by 
government on the basis of their operational and financial performance. The seven CEOs were 
managing organizations that included multiple hospitals (e.g. 3 large hospitals), annual budgets 
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exceeding £500 million ($650 million), and up to 10,000 staff. The smallest organization had 3,000 
employees and a budget of £200 million ($270 million). Two organizations were in an expansion 
phase, three were undergoing consolidation, and two were either in difficulty or had recently 
experienced problems. Our selection was based on theoretical sampling: we purposefully chose to 
study these executives because of their need to manage multiple, often competing demands (see 
summary in Figure 1). From our background research, we were aware that in order to manage such 
complex webs of accountability, the CEOs would likely be processing huge amounts of information. 
Therefore, we identified them as ideal cases to explore the intricacies of how CEOs pay attention in 
challenging settings. 
 





Sample and access 
For reasons of anonymity, we refer to all the CEOs by male names (since at the time of our study there 
were fewer female than male CEOs, female names might be more revealing of real identities). The 
sample was chosen purposefully to include an almost even ratio of men to women (3:4), to maximize 
analytical diversity and allow examination of possible variance (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). For 
the same reasons, we recruited CEOs with diverse professional backgrounds (i.e. NHS management, 
private sector, nursing, medical), and at different career stages in terms of current tenure (i.e. 3 months 
to over 5 years) and overall experience at CEO level (i.e. 1st or 2nd experience). We also chose 
organizations with different levels of performance based on then-published regulator assessments. 
Access was obtained through a combination of personal contacts and direct requests to CEOs deemed 
potentially interested, for example because of previous participation in knowledge-exchange activities. 
Our success rate was high, with around one in every two contacted agreeing to participate. Stated 
rationales included their role becoming subject to such public scrutiny that “they had nothing to hide”, 
and our offer of comparative feedback sessions. Although some well-known CEOs declined, there was 
some element of self-selection. While this constitutes a limitation, since CEOs keen to display their 
practices may have been more open to participating (see Siggelkow 2007), we believe the effects on 
representativeness, and hence data reliability, are limited, given our sampling diversity considerations, 
and the qualitative, explorative nature of our study. Our interest was not in identifying best practice, 
but rather in mapping the phenomenon. The research also included a number of opportunities for 
member validation. Alongside individual CEO feedback sessions, we held two workshops with two 
groups of seven and eight other CEOs where we shared emerging results (there were 154 hospitals and 
56 mental health trusts in England at the time). The feedback from these workshops showed that our 
account was reasonably accurate and echoed the experiences of other CEOs. 
Data collection 
Our main data collection method was shadowing (Czarniawska 2007, McDonald 2005), which 
involves the researcher following an actor throughout the working day, and observing as much as 
possible. Six of the executives were observed for a minimum of five weeks (in one case, the CEO was 
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observed for only 3.5 weeks due to last-minute CEO availability). We were able to document most 
aspects of the CEOs’ work, save occasional one-to-one supervisory sessions, personal HR-related 
meetings, and private contact with patients. In the case of particularly sensitive events, we collected 
post-hoc accounts via short ethnographic interviews (Spradley 1979). The same method was used to 
collect information about CEOs’ work at home or when commuting. Field notes were taken mostly in-
vivo using tablet computers. On the few occasions this was deemed inappropriate, notes were written 
up shortly after the event during “downtime” moments (e.g. while the CEO was replying to emails). 
The observations were complemented by interviews.  We conducted formal semi-structured interviews 
with five CEOs, either during or just after the final weeks of observation. The interviews lasted 
between 40 and 65 minutes, and were recorded and transcribed verbatim. The remaining two CEOs 
were interviewed informally. Both had shared their reflections extensively during on-site visits, and 
their diaries made scheduling of a formal interview difficult. These ethnographic interviews were also 
recorded and transcribed verbatim and used in the analysis. We also conducted an additional two 
interviews with CEO personal assistants (PAs) – in both cases interviews were recorded and 
transcribed. 
Finally, the documentation obtained during our observations, which included meeting papers, articles 
referenced by CEOs and publications consulted, was another valuable source of data. The amount of 
documentation varied across sites - from thousands of pages to around a hundred. In the case of CEOs 
who were not comfortable with sharing too much documentation, we consulted publicly available 
information such as regulator assessments, and explored these in informal interviews.  
Data analysis 
We used an iterative process to analyze the data, alternating inductive and abductive coding in the 
tradition of interpretive scholarship (Golden-Biddle and Locke 2007, Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 
2006, Locke, Feldman and Golden-Biddle 2015). Data analysis started during data collection. No set 
analytical categories were identified prior to entry into the field, although this exploratory research 
was focused initially on how CEOs deal with information, with the practice approach as a sensitizing 
frame (Gioia, Corley and Hamilton 2013). Both researchers regularly read through and reflected on 
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their field notes during the shadowing, and in particular before each return to the field, and wrote 
analytical notes. Eventually, these notes were expanded into 10-12 page analytical memos, which 
synthesized emerging insights from each case and enabled cross-case comparative and joint analysis.  
At the end of the fieldwork, we worked inductively, interrogating the memos for emerging patterns 
and going back and forth between memos and original field notes (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006). 
We coded all the data related to how the CEOs dealt with information. With the help of the memos 
containing initial hunches, we grouped the codes inductively into broader categories and themes. It 
was at this point that attention began to emerge as a significant aspect. The first round of inductive 
coding generated categories and themes which confirmed previous research, but were not particularly 
novel (e.g. CEOs were constantly vigilant, routines and people were important attention aids, CEOs 
put considerable effort into making sense of events). However, other interesting and unexpected 
findings also emerged: at times some things were beyond the CEOs’ control; the CEOs gave their 
attention to others; the CEOs spent time making sense of things which once they became clear 
signified completion of their work. We noted also that CEOs seemed able to survive the constant 
bombardment of stimuli to which they were subjected.  
In line with the principle of abductive “live” coding (Locke, Feldman and Golden-Biddle 2015), we 
reformulated our research around “how did they do it”, and articulated the three attentional 
challenges. It became clear that what we were studying was attentional engagement (see Ragin and 
Becker 1992). Encouraged by the comments from the reviewers, we conducted a complete recoding 
of our field notes (some million words), using comparative tables to shed light on the minutiae of the 
practices. We proceeded inductively, starting by organizing the findings around three main desired 
outcomes (regulating attention, sustaining attention, and managing attention actively). We revised the 
paper on this basis, establishing relationships between challenges, the practices used to address them, 
desired effects (see Figure 4 in the discussion), and things that could go wrong (see Table 4). 
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FINDINGS: ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGE OF VOLUME THROUGH PRACTICES 
FOR ACTIVATING AND REGULATING ATTENTION 
 
As suggested in the literature and shown by our data, a critical task for top managers is maintaining a 
balance between too little and too much information, and distinguishing between relevant signals and 
noise. We found that the CEOs managed this by establishing and maintaining an evolving bundle of 
activating and regulating practices which entailed specific routines, relationships, and artefacts. These 
practices, with which we are all familiar (hence our succinct discussion), enabled the CEOs to manage 
the challenge of volume, keep tabs on what was happening, and infer appropriate foci for attention.  
Formal or informal meetings (e.g. corridor meetings, walk-abouts) were the single most common 
routines aimed at activating (“feeding”) and regulating attention, though activation was done also in 
less obvious ways. Consider the vignette in Box 1. David (CEO2) saw his routine visit to the cafeteria 
as another potential opportunity to actively “monitor” his environment. He did this constantly, 
supplementing periodic review meetings with unscheduled encounters. David thus continuously and 
actively “fed” his attention, by transforming impromptu interactions into “information grounds”, 
defined as situations with a specific purpose which nevertheless generate a social atmosphere that 
fosters spontaneous and serendipitous sharing of information (Pettigrew 1999, p. 811).  
The repetitive nature of meetings and other routinized information gathering practices was critical for 
activating and regulating.  Their periodic occurrence was key to ensuring that the CEOs received 
sufficient information. However, their repetition served two other functions. First, the practice of 
examining the same things at different points in time helped them to spot variances and unusual 
signals, and identify the appearance of a “difference that makes [could make] a difference” (Bateson 
1979, p. 99). CEOs actively construct the background against which issues acquire emphasis and 
become potentially meaningful. Second, repetition allowed the CEOs to ignore certain things as 
“routine”, regulating the number of issues they needed to attend to. In short, vigilance was obtained 
amid and through a carefully assembled bundle of practices. 
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Similar to David who we quoted above, all the CEOs also paid attention through people: in David’s 
case, Sam and the cafeteria staff acted as his eyes and ears. All the CEOs nurtured a complex network 
of relations from which they gathered information, and confirmed or rejected evolving hunches. 
Within these networks, they distinguished between distant informants who were used as sources of 
signals and whose information was taken with a grain of salt (e.g. cafeteria staff), and trusted 
informants such as Sam, but also board members, assistants, and former colleagues. We refer to this 
network of informants as the CEO’s “attentional inner circle” (Nicolini, Korica & Ruddle 2015). Its 
members paid attention on the CEOs’ behalf and reported back, but the CEOs processed and 
triangulated this information in light especially of competing insights. Finally, CEOs used a variety of 
mainly quite low-tech attentional artefacts for activating and regulating attention. These included 
folder systems (David’s in full view on one side of his desk), action logs (with headings such as 
‘Action’, ‘Assigned to’, ‘Action response’, and ‘Status’), email inboxes, post-it notes, open doors that 
transformed the office into a scanning mechanism, and social media such as Twitter. As Jim (CEO7) 
put it, “if you follow the right people, you will see most of the important things coming up”. Table 1 
summarizes and compares the CEOs’ practices of activation and regulation. 
Insert Table 1 here: A comparison of the CEOs’ activating and regulating practices  
 
The bundle of familiar practices used to activate and regulate attention had several interesting aspects.  
First, they were context-sensitive (e.g. if a department is struggling, you want to stay in close contact 
with the regulator) and history-dependent (e.g. it had taken years for Michael [CEO3], a highly 
prominent CEO of a successful large hospital, to build his sophisticated monitoring IT system). In 
contrast, Alan (CEO4), who at the time had been in post only for months, inherited a bare-bones 
system and had to rebalance by relying on a dense social network. These aspects reflected both 
personal preferences and tenure. For example, Michael (CEO3), who described himself as an external 
thinker, paid attention predominantly with and through an inner circle of executives. In contrast, Jim 
(CEO7) a self-confessed people-person, relied on a small circle of trusted counsellors, and used 
technology predominantly to keep abreast of what was happening outside his organization. David 
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(CEO2), in turn, had been in post for over five years and his team had been in place for most of that 
time, with the result that he was more able to rely on others to pay attention on his behalf.  
Second, all the elements worked together. For example, routine meetings, personal connections, and 
social media acted collectively to gather weak signals, identify issues, and confirm or deny evolving 
hunches. By using these practices in combination, the CEOs could keep in touch with what was 
happening on their patch, and tacitly infer which issues were worth paying attention to, while 
discarding others. To these ends, all the CEOs built into their attentional infrastructures a certain level 
of redundancy which improved reliability. For instance, Michael (CEO3) had access to a sophisticated 
monitoring system, but regularly visited the wards to gather serendipitous information and identify 
issues the system or his trusted executives might have missed. These types of arrangements allowed 
the CEOs to conjointly scan environments for specific information and maintain continued, mundane 
attentiveness to non-routine, but potentially relevant cues. 
Third, the arrangements acted as vigilance mechanisms and tools for filtering attentional cues. For 
example, while all CEOs spent considerable time with their PAs reviewing agendas and sifting 
through emails, this took place after the PAs had already drastically reduced what needed to be 
considered. The CEOs relied also on attention artefacts such as filing folders, which provided a 
physical division between what needed attention and what could be ignored.  
Finally, the activating and regulating practices frequently became performative and began actively to 
shape both the CEO’s attention and identity. For instance, David (CEO 2) saw himself as a delegator, 
but his detailed exception matrices involved him deeply in day-to-day management. Also, his inner 
attentional circle included mostly finance and operations directors. As a result, at times he was 
focusing on a more granular level of detail than other CEOs. Thus, David’s attentional practices 
performed both work and a personal identity, which diverged from his desired (notional) identity. 
James (1890, p. 446) wrote that “we notice what we are attuned to discern”. David, like the other 
CEOs, noticed what his attentional practices, relationships, and artefacts allowed him to discern.  
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ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGE OF FRAGMENTATION VIA FOCUSING PRACTICES  
Consider this rather typical morning for Stuart (CEO1): 
At 9 am, the CEO calls one of his confidants. They discuss who Stuart could see on their exec 
team, regarding an issue he has been struggling with for weeks. The person gives suggestions. 
Stuart says he will take some advice from the board and pick up their conversation next week. 
At 9.33, he stands up, takes a stack of papers and reads while walking to a large meeting on 
impact of new nursing education arrangements on the workforce. After mingling, Stuart sits 
up front, taking notes and nods throughout. He leaves at 10.25 and walks back to his office. 
While checking emails, speaks quickly with the PA regarding a conversation he had at the 
meeting. A few seconds later, the PA pops in and says a consultant working on a change 
program is here, did Stuart want to see him? The consultant comes in. The CEO explains that 
staff have asked how his company's reports were used as part of decision-making for the 
closure of a certain service. Asks the consultant to walk him through all the work he’s done. 
Takes the notebook to write, saying memory isn't what it used to be. At 10.55, the PA pops in 
and says “next meeting”. The CEO walks the consultant out, reiterating how they agreed to 
solve the problem. Stuart collects his papers and prepares to meet a local MP to discuss 
progress with the new hospital. (Field notes) 
 
This vignette shows how Stuart’s attention was pulled in different directions: he was having to deal 
with very different people, issues, and demands. It also hints at the fact that different issues have 
different temporal duration and require different forms of engagement. For example, whom to include 
in the new exec team stretched over several weeks, while the workforce event was quickly considered. 
Top managers thus need to distribute their attention across different issues and time scales. We focus 
on three distinctive attentional engagement practices, which allowed the CEOs to address this issue: 
giving away their attention without attention going away (making attention transferable); 
continuously acting mono-focally in relation to evolving situations (segmenting attention); and 
operating within three distinct temporal cycles (making attention temporally differentiated).  
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Transferring attention: Intentionally giving away attention without attention going away  
CEOs’ attentional engagement is partly given and partly decided. However, top managers have one 
option that is not always available to other staff: they can give away or transfer their attention. 
Consider the following short example:  
Rob (CEO 5) and the HR lead go through the individual senior nursing posts urgently needed 
in a medical ward. He is given a print out, looks at it and agrees that they should approve a 
post […]. Rob then turns back to the finance controller and summarizes the position, 
clarifying that “the cost is your budget” and that he wants to be sure that “there are no double 
whammies in there”. Rob expects him to “keep an eye” on it. (Field notes) 
Here we see Rob delegating attention to budgeting issues to the financial controller who is asked to 
sustain this attention for a specific post. Thus, attention is maintained by being transferred to a third 
party, allowing Rob to address the challenge of fragmentation imposed by other attentional demands. 
More broadly, CEOs create attention for others in two ways: by signaling what is important and is 
worth paying attention to, and by transferring attention through direct delegation. The CEOs did this 
continually during formal meetings and following informal conversations. 
Passing on or delegating attention is critical for explaining some of the practices the CEOs engaged in 
to maintain focus when threatened by information overload. Maintaining attention was mostly 
initiated by finding out “what this is a case of”, and to answer the question “who should take care of 
it”. This allows the CEOs to give away attention without it going away. Here, trust is critical: CEOs 
need to believe that when they stop paying attention, the issue will continue to receive the necessary 
attention from someone else. If there is weak trust, it is supplemented by other practices to ensure that 
attention does not go away when given away. For example, the action log was critical to David’s 
capacity to remain vigilant about the issues passed on. This allowed the CEOs to sustain meta-






Segmenting attention: Acting mono-focally in a poly-focal world 
The variety, fragmentation, and discontinuity characterizing managerial work (Mintzberg 1973) 
results in CEOs needing to focus on multiple things at the same time. This suggests that managers will 
be predisposed to becoming generalists, operating at an abstract level, and considering things 
superficially. However, our study revealed a more complex picture. In attentional terms, all CEOs 
were aware of the risks of attending to and focusing on many things at the same time (poly-focality). 
Indeed, they developed personal remedial strategies to recreate the “closed room” intimacy typical of 
mono-focality in a job that steered them in the opposite direction. For instance, Jim (CEO7) told us 
“my colleagues know that an open door means ‘come in’, but a closed door is ‘let me work in peace’”.  
A mono-focal orientation was also applied systematically to the multitude of encounters that occupied 
large swaths of the CEOs’ time, as the extract below illustrates: 
Alan (CEO4) and I are driving to a review meeting of the newly established maternity 
service. In the car, Alan excuses himself, explaining he must consider the paperwork with 
great attention: “they do not understand that for me this is one of the hundred things I deal 
with… they want full attention, they want to feel that we addressed the issue with great care”. 
(Field notes)  
While Alan could not devote too much attention to the specific issue, he also could not afford to give 
the impression of lack of attention. Having agreed to attend the meeting which signaled that issue was 
deserving of attention amidst other demands, he could not be seen as uninterested which would send 
the opposite signal. Therefore, CEOs like Alan were both chief attention payers and chief attention 
signalers.   
The CEOs’ attentional engagement was characterized by a sequence of distinct social situations, each 
treated mono-focally. Of course, there were exceptions, and at times the CEO appeared distracted and 
peripheral to the discussion. However, such exceptions were rare and noticed quickly by colleagues, 
prompting extenuations (e.g. “Sorry, I’m very tired today”). Such justifications were also supported 
by frequent acknowledgment of the demands imposed by the need for CEOs to act mono-focally at all 




Identifying the span of attention necessary and dealing with short, medium, and long-term 
attentional cycles 
The CEOs not only allocated attention carefully across clearly segmented issues, they also actively 
distinguished between different timescales, and engaged accordingly. For example, in the vignette at 
the beginning of this section, Stuart (CEO1) deals with short-term issues measured in hours (e.g. 
meetings), medium-term issues measured in days or weeks (e.g. inspection by the regulator), and 
long-term issues measured in years (e.g. construction of a new hospital). These generated different 
“attentional cycles”, defined as the time between when the CEO begins to pay attention and when this 
attention ends.i We found the CEOs used distinct practices to deal with different cycles, as outlined 
below.  
Sustaining attention during short-term attentional cycles 
Short-term attentional cycles were a constant feature of the CEOs’ work: they spent most of their time 
dipping in and out of events. For example, during our observations, David (CEO2) attended an 
average of 4.8 scheduled and 2.4 unscheduled events per day,ii which excluded brief encounters, calls, 
emails, and similar. As far as was possible, the CEOs treated each of these events as a complete 
attentional cycle, or in the case of longer, multi-item events (e.g. periodic board meetings), as a 
collection of quasi-complete attentional engagements. They achieved this by segmenting and 
circumscribing their attention and limiting the time devoted to preparation, as in the above example of 
Alan (CEO4) reading the meeting papers while en route to that meeting. They also engaged in Alan’s 
(CEO4) other strategy of paying intensive and careful attention for a time, then dipping out. Finally, 
they tried to avoid unintended attentional spillages that might prolong attentional engagement. They 
did this by ensuring that every issue was assigned to an owner during or soon after the relevant event. 
A frequent question was, “Can I leave that with [two people] to think about and come back to us?” 
(Field notes). In summary, the CEOs focused their attention within multiple circumscribed attentional 
cycles in which they acted mono-focally. The goal was to ensure the cycles were completed, allowing 
them to disengage attentionally and move on to the next issue. 
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The capacity of the CEOs to maintain the requisite attention in many short-term attentional cycles was 
helped by the events having their own attentional structures. This was enabled by a combination of 
tools and artefacts, social interactions, discourses mediated by tools and people, and the actors’ 
experiences, and interests (to paraphrase Bourdieu, 1990, their attentional “habitus”). Thus, a distinct 
attentional engagement was built into the fabric of the activity. An example is provided in Box 
2Error! Reference source not found.. 
 
In this vignette, Jim’s (CEO7) attention is pre-structured by the review form (providing a number of 
attention foci), the formal requirements of the review process, the items included by Julie, Julie’s 
presence, and Julie’s experience of previous reviews. While he had plenty of attentional work left to 
do, most of his attention was thus already allocated through a social and an individual process (Jones 
2005). This pre-existing structure helped Jim to close the attentional cycle by giving away attention to 
others and quickly identifying the issues requiring further attention. 
 
Sustaining attention during medium-term attentional cycles  
CEOs also dealt with issues that stretched across days or weeks, which we call medium-term 
attentional cycles. Some were too complex to be resolved within a short-term attentional cycle e.g. 
ROB’S PERFORMANCE REVIEW  
 
Jim (CEO 7) meets Julie, their director of organization development, to carry out her annual performance 
review. They are sitting in the corner of the room. They discover that they have the wrong review document. I 
offer to go and make a copy. After a few seconds the “proper” review starts. The first point is on facilitating 
communication with stakeholders. Jim takes the opportunity to double check the status of the communication 
with GPs. Julie explains how they ought to engage GP in community services who are reluctant. Jim decides 
that this is an issue to be raised at Exec Team. Jim stands up, gets their pad and writes this down. Next thing is 
Julie’s goal to monitor and turn around an at risk service (a maternity unit). Julie explains what she has done 
and the agreement they have made with the services to improve their position. Jim jokes about converting the 
new maternity centre into a hotel again. Jim notes that one of the items missing is the business development 
strategy and the development of a marketing plan, which is not in the review document. Julie says that this is 
due partly to a lack of staff: “as a trust, our momentum is always for path redesign, but what is missing is a 
market analysis to go with that”. Jim agrees. They discuss who may be suitable for the role. Julie articulates 
what they think the person should do. Jim says they have no money for any of these jobs and asks Julie if Julie 
could try to find a solution […] (Field notes) 
 
Box 2: The structure of attention during a performance review 
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Michael (CEO3) organizing meetings abroad. Some required clarification before identifying 
appropriate action, while others resisted closure. For instance, Jim (CEO7) agonized for days about 
whether to send a strong message to a unit’s staff regarding their poor performance. In the course of 
those days, he consulted several people without reaching any conclusion (he eventually decided not to 
send the message). In this case, ambiguity and uncertainty led to extended attentional engagement. 
While all the CEOs dealt with medium-term attentional engagements via their working memory – 
Craig (CEO6) told us that he had been “carrying an issue in his mind” for weeks, “waiting until it's 
crystallized” – most of this work was externalized and distributed elsewhere, both materially and 
socially. Besides keeping notes and using “to do” lists and email folders to keep attention “alive”, the 
CEOs engaged extensively in conversationto retain the focus on certain issues. They created and 
extended chains of focused attention cycles involving conversational work on the issue until it could 
be given away. For example, Alan (CEO4) was faced with the dismissal of certain clinicians 
following poor external assessment of a unit. Over the course of around 10 days, he referred to this 
issue almost daily with different people, ranging from the members of his closest team to the board 
chair. By so doing, he maintained his attention and the attention of those around him, allowing him to 
make sense of the problem. Narrating and re-narrating helped the CEOs to “connect the dots” and 
retain focus within an attentional cycle. 
Sustaining attention during long-term attentional cycles 
While our observations covered a maximum of three months per CEO, we did gain some insights into 
how the CEOs managed their long-term attentional engagement.  
Overall, paying attention to long-term issues was less deliberate than in the case of short and medium-
term issues. Attentional foci were built into the fabric of the activities as described above. These foci 
were often a manifestation of what ABV authors call the attentional structure of the firm and industry 
(Ocasio 1997). This meant that the CEOs found themselves oriented towards paying attention to 
certain long-term issues with little observable intentionality: they constantly monitored the long-term 
performance targets imposed by the government, while periodic regulator inspections meant they 
remained vigilant. Long-term attentional engagement was associated also to periodic organizational 
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obligations largely outside of the CEOs’ control. These included annual financial reporting, board 
meetings, and signing off on formal complaints. This last requirement was imposed by government 
and was aimed at keeping CEO attention focused on safety and patient satisfaction.  
However, CEOs also used a bundle of practices to sustain long-term attentional engagement for the 
things that they considered important. For example, long-standing attentional issues were built into the 
agendas of periodic meetings as recurring items. The CEOs also relied on communicative and 
interactional practices. For example, Craig (CEO6) often verbalized his “attention priorities, plans, 
and values” in what he called a “stream of consciousness” with his executive team, while Alan (CEO 
4) repeatedly explained his attentional priorities during regular consultation events organized to keep 
staff abreast of the evolving state of the organization. While these events were aimed at structuring the 
attention of the rest of the organization, they also sustained the CEO’s attentional engagement related 
to what he thought was important in the long-term: communication to others was also partly 
communication to himself. As Craig (CEO 6) put it, “I need to tell them so that I remind myself what 
my vision is” (Field notes). 
Finally, attentional engagement on long-term issues was inscribed in more intimate conversations, for 
example with personal coaches, two of whom had worked with CEOs for several years. Among other 
things, these occasions served to reveal and re-evaluate the CEOs’ attention priorities. For example, 
Craig (CEO6) spent an hour with his coach discussing his previously-agreed top five strategic 
priorities, and noted that “there is a bit of re-jigging to do…”. While the discussion adopted the 
language of values and identity, it also provided an occasion to review, reinforce, and modify 
attentional priorities, and thus, to sustain long-term attentional engagement. Our findings on how 
CEOs sustain attention during long-term attentional cycles are summarized in Table 2. 
 




When the different ways to sustain attention over time come together 
While in the previous section we clearly distinguished between the practices, in reality these did not 
operate in isolation. At times, short-term issues were connected with medium and long term ones, 
from which they derived meaning and to which they contributed. Consider the vignette in Box 3.  
 
On the surface, the vignette illustrates the social and conversational practices through which 
attentional engagement was sustained in the middle-term. On closer inspection, however, we can see 
short-term attentional issues being conversationally weaved together into a meaningful medium-term 
canvas, and long-term concerns poking through. Like in the ancient artistic practice of pentimento 
(the presence or emergence, in a painting, of earlier images or strokes that have been changed and 
At a regional meeting, David (CEO2), attends a presentation after which several colleagues 
note “the 3rd quarter was very challenging”, and savings generated by organizational changes 
will be too late. On the way back, he stops to report to the Director of a struggling department. 
He references the comments as evidence that all trusts are increasingly getting in a bad 
financial position, and trouble is brewing. When we return to the office, David visits the 
Finance Director, one of his most trusted colleagues, and reports again the gist of the meeting. 
They consider: “nowadays there are so many targets and performance measures… Today I 
heard about one target I didn’t even know existed – and I am usually on top of things. There is 
a perfect storm brewing. Our income has been frozen below inflation. Initiatives to reduce 
admissions started working – but the fact that GPs started to refer [patients to us] much less 
also means loss of income. […] We will end in a crisis… Either a collapse in quality or 
probably a financial crisis… Or both. You heard it this morning… a lot of CEOs are already 
experiencing it… the perfect storm is brewing”. Later in the day, David also pops by the HR 
Director’s office. They reflect briefly on the important meeting in the morning, and he repeats 
again the ‘perfect storm’ story as a way to summarise it. 
Next day, David has a one-to-one meeting with the Chair of the Board. During the conversation, 
while reporting the difficulties the hospital is experiencing, David repeats again ‘the perfect 
storm’, further refining it: “actually there is another factor for the perfect storm - we cannot cut 
corners, as we have so many performance and quality targets... Do you remember the 18 weeks 
target? It is still there”. When back in the office, the CEO explains to me the idea of a ‘perfect 
storm’ (appears to be using me as a sounding board, although, as always, I remain silent). David 
stands up and writes the three ingredients of the ‘perfect storm’ on the whiteboard. The names 
are changed a couple of times. When done, a visibly satisfied David returns to writing emails. 
He tells me he sent the idea to two of the closest members of the exec team. Later that evening, 
David is meeting the local Member of Parliament. During the conversation, he repeats the 
argument of the perfect storm, this time pointing at his whiteboard to explain. 
Next day, David recounts the story once more during the weekly executive team meeting. This 
time, the story is put to concrete work, as prompt to ‘so, what can we do to weather the storm’? 
On returning to the office, the CEO adds two more components to the white board.  [In the 
following days, the narrative is used over and over, until it seemingly fades away] 
 
(Reconstructed from field notes) 
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painted over), long-term attentional concerns, like the overall survival of the organisation, manifest 
and are invoked. While at the end of the story David does nothing specific, the story is committed to 
memory for possible benefit of future events, ready to inform future attentional processes. The 
vignette thus paints a laminated view of the practices to deal with different attentional cycles. The 
idea of lamination was introduced by Goffman (1974) to emphasise that while multiple, 
heterogeneous and heterochronic practices (and frames) operate at the same time, in specific 
circumstances they are agentively combined and woven into moments of action.  While the practices 
to deal with different attentional cycles can be kept distinct for mainly analytical purposes, they 
operate in laminated ways, with juxtapositions and intersections occurring in a number of occasions. 
ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGE OF VARIETY BY PRIORITIZING PRACTICES 
CEOs have to juggle multiple issues and stakeholders, and deal with matters ranging from minute to 
strategic. Consider the following: 
 
Alan (CEO 4) is reading his emails and smiles. Then he turns to me and comments: “This is 
how ridiculous my life is…” He just received an email from a doctor who wants to drop off a 
T-shirt for him. Alan compares this to the “big stuff” of the previous meeting and says “I go 
from that to this”. (Field notes) 
 
All CEOs could find themselves in similarly “ridiculous” situations. They had to pay attention to 
many concurrent issues and maintain a clear sense of what mattered to them, while making time for 
already partly pre-set attention (described by Alan as “mortgaged” attention).   
In the previous two sections, we showed that to manage competing attentional demands, CEOs rely on 
distinct activating and regulating practices, which needed to sustain attentional engagement over time. 
In this section, we focus on how attentional practices were employed to allocate differential attention 
according to the nature of the issue, that is to prioritize. Our findings suggest that CEOs continuously 
and actively weeded out issues by filtering, categorizing, and selecting. They remained cognizant of 
the level of concern related to each issue and the attentional cycle it might trigger, and escalated and 
de-escalated matters with an eye to clearing the table of resolved or re-allocated issues. This enabled 
27 
 
the allocation of scarce attention and a balance between the “pull” issues raised by others demanding 
their attention, and CEOs’ “push” desires to focus on what they considered important. This on-going 
prioritization process is summarized in Figure 2. The left side focuses on the level of concern, with 
attentional demands experienced by the CEOs bottom left. The two arrows refer to the divergent 
forces at work. The tension promoted by these divergent forces and its various resolutions are 
discussed next.  
 
Figure 2: How CEOs allocate their attentional engagement  
 
Managing attentional demands by “weeding out”   
To manage the continuous barrage of competing demands, the CEOs engaged first in often highly 
routinized weeding out practices to rid themselves of certain issues – see Box 4 below.  
BOX 4 - MICHAEL (CEO3): DAILY BATTLE TO PRIORITIZE ISSUES  
 
Michael (CEO3) sits to look at his correspondence with the PA. Each mail and email are in a 
see-through folder. The PA takes each out, writes on it with an action and puts it on a pile on the 
coffee table. Michael signs the first letter, then second. Reads next out loud and comments "oh 
for God’s sake!" Puts two ticks. Says "oh God" to another letter, then reads for two minutes in 
silence (PA waits). Next item is given to Director of Delivery to deal with as not urgent. Next are 
requests to see him. The first is from a Times journalist, but it is not urgent from Michael’s 
perspective. The PA asks if he wants to meet the second. Michael notes that woman gets on his 
nerves (“disorganized bunch of flipping wasters”) and to get him out of it. Next letter is from a 
regional Councilor. Michael looks at it and suggests another date. Says “ok” to next (city 
council letterhead) and "what the fuck is that?" to final item (newsletter of some sort). He reads 




In this example, the PA, as a key part of the CEO’s personal attentional infrastructure, helped him 
prioritize according to importance and urgency. Michael (CEO3), similar to the other CEOs, took a 
personal approach to distinguishing between “serious things”, “small fry”, “urgent/not urgent stuff”, 
and “noise”. Importance was assessed first: issues were considered attentionally significant because 
they emanated from formal obligations and could not be ignored, because previous experience 
suggested that they were significant, because relevant others were paying attention to them, or 
because they fitted existing or emerging discourses circulating in the professional community (e.g. 
future financial reforms). Urgency was considered secondarily, because importance was judged 
against the context of anticipated further implications: at what point will the issue create problems?  
Issues associated with something deemed important were monitored, even though their nature initially 
might be unclear. For instance, we observed Michael (CEO3) starting to notice small hints regarding 
the effectiveness of his executive team. Because this was important, he began prioritizing by paying 
attention. He was seeing “cracks appear” and “I can't have that” (Field notes). These early indications, 
whose exact implications were unclear, meant that Michael remained attentionally engaged with the 
issue for several weeks (medium-length attentional cycle), with the topic reemerging in several 
conversations until he eventually took action and made changes. 
Managing attention by escalating and de-escalating issues 
The necessary accompaniment to weeding out was “clearing the table” of as many resolved issues as 
possible and as quickly as possible to make room for new issues or those the CEOs considered 
important. The CEOs used different temporal cycles and strategies as described above to deal with 
issues of high and low importance, the rule of thumb being the minimum possible attention. What 
Michael (CEO3) described as “small fry” issues were filtered or immediately given away. In fact, 
their appearance was seen as reflecting a malfunctioning of the personal attentional infrastructure, and 
occasionally led to its revision. Other “small fry” issues which resisted closure, like the above-
mentioned cracks in the team, were not dismissed so readily. In those cases, the CEOs would try to 
establish their importance and cause. If they were identified as instances of “something bigger”, they 
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would be escalated and linked to an existing long-term attentional cycle issue – an example being the 
mistreatment of an alcoholic patient which was considered a sign of a deeper cultural problem. Other 
issues might be de-escalated or passed to someone else, leaving room for new “small fry” problems.  
Managing attention by minimizing obligations 
While CEOs tried actively to clear their desks of new emerging issues, they still had to deal with those 
that could not be de-escalated or given away. Several CEOs said that much of their attention was 
occupied by issues and obligations not of their choosing. Stuart (CEO1) said: “95% of my monthly 
obligations are already mapped out at the start of each month”. These included attendance at board 
meetings (requiring attentional engagement for several days prior to and after the event), overseeing 
the fiscal year end accounts (which absorbed much attention over at least two weeks), and dealing 
with patient complaints (an on-going long-term obligation). In such cases, CEOs could try to 
minimize the attentional engagement required by creating robust routines or delegating parts of the 
task to others, or would simply “endure it”.  
Figure 3 depicts the continuous competition between issues demanding the CEOs’ attention, and their 
constant efforts to prioritize what they deemed important. Minor issues (“small fry” on the left) tended 
to occupy CEO attention continuously through their cumulation, which made them longer-term than 
expected issues triggering longer than expected attentional cycles. Formal obligations and external 
demands also tended to consume too much CEO attention. The top right of Figure 3 depicts the 
CEOs’ continuous attempts to push back to allow prioritization of the most important and relevant 
issues. This struggle was never-ending: our study demonstrates that executive attention is clearly an 




Figure 3: CEOs’ continuous struggle to manage attentional engagement and prioritize 
 
Attentional repair: Maintaining the fit between attentional infrastructure, attentional 
engagement, and attentional demands 
One of the problems related to prioritization is ensuring a fit between current attentional demands and 
the CEOs’ attentional infrastructure, which supports their attentional engagement. This is particularly 
relevant given that attentional practices took on habitual forms based on past experience. As Stuart 
(CEO1) said, “it’s sort of… using a structure that had worked for me in the past... after a while it just 
… [Becomes instinctive?] That’s right”. Failure to achieve this fit can lead to attentional dysfunctions 
such as information overload, missing something of critical importance, forgetting to deal with a 
critical matter, or paying too much attention to pre-existing obligations. The CEOs’ attentional 
infrastructure thus required continuous adaptation, though we did not necessarily observe proactive 
adaptation following focused reflection regarding overall fit. More often than not, the occurrence of a 
minor or major breakdown would trigger adaptation or “repair”. Although our observation of each 
CEO spanned only a few weeks, we observed several adaptations and their triggers. These are 
summarized in Table 3. 
Insert Table 3 here: Repairing CEOs’ attentional engagement practices and their triggers 
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First, we observed changes triggered by frequency, such as the recurrence of specific minor issues or 
too many “false alarms”, which highlighted the need for a (re)tuning of the attentional infrastructure 
or a revision to the weeding out prioritization practices. Second, changes could be triggered by 
negative feedback, which signaled inadequacies in existing attentional engagement practices. These 
might relate to performance issues, that is, a current arrangement which was proving ineffective or out 
of date. For example, Craig (CEO6) told us that his existing attentional engagement practices, which 
reflected the organization in crisis that he inherited, needed to be updated to reflect the organization’s 
current, more steady state. Finally, adjustments could be triggered by external events, such as changes 
to the sector’s accountability regime, performance metrics, or sector discourses. For example, Jim 
(CEO7) made the deliberate decision to reduce the time allocated to certain stakeholders to allow him 
to give more attention to “new things happening in the local economy”.   
Thus, the content in the cells in Figure 3 was constantly evolving. For example, we observed minor 
issues being escalated to the top right and affecting the long-term attention rules; seeming “small fry” 
issues being recognized as symptoms of a larger, new problem, and given more importance; 
temporary issues becoming “experience”, which generated new rules of thumb for the future; and 
recurrent emerging minor issues being seen as indications of change in the wider accountability 
landscape. Other issues moved to the left through de-escalation (i.e. identified, circumscribed, then 
given away). Too many issues in the bottom right of the Figure or too much uncertainty led to focused 
revisions. New institutional obligations and shifts in the wider accountability landscape led to changes 
to the right hand side of the Figure (e.g. concern over finance). 
However, as already mentioned, most repairs to attentional infrastructures occurred post, rather than 
pre-breakdown. The nature of the breakdown determined the corrective action, which often involved a 
rebalancing by adding or removing certain elements. The prioritization and extent of the repair 
depended on the perceived importance of the consequences observed, but also on the relative 
significance of that element for the CEOs’ attentional engagement. Table 4 summarizes the failures 
experienced by each of the CEOs and the specific remedial actions taken. For instance, David’s 
(CEO2) activating and regulating practices led him to focus too much on operational details, while the 
limits in his existing personal network caused him to miss some emerging organizational issues. 
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Having recognized the problem, he used his existing contacts to expand his network to include other 
strategic actors whose insights would ensure he was on top of things. In contrast, Michael’s (CEO3) 
diverse activating and regulating practices, which ensured variety through reliance not just on his 
executive team and IT system but also on impromptu ward visits, allowed him to identify a major 
issue that his team had not reported. This enabled him to identify complacency about information 
sharing as an issue, resulting from too much delegation and trust over time. Repair consisted of re-
introduction of regular executive team meetings. Importantly, because Michael’s executive team was 
a key part of his attentional infrastructure and because the problem identified involved hundreds of 
staff, the failure of these executives to trigger Michael’s requisite attention was taken very seriously. 
Specifically, it was connected to a bigger issue (“can I really rely on my team?”) and prioritized for 
several weeks.  
Insert Table 4 here: Actively managing attention via repair 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, we examined how CEOs in the English NHS handle the challenges of volume, 
fragmentation, and variety related to attentional engagement. We found that CEOs avoided or 
minimized attentional dysfunction associated with these challenges by utilizing an attentional 
infrastructure which included practices for activating and regulating attention, focusing practices, and 





Figure 4: The attentional infrastructure of CEOs  
 
To address the challenge of volume, that is the need to capture the critical variations in the internal 
and external environment without being overwhelmed by too much data, the CEOs used a unique 
combination of routines, relationships, and artefacts for activation and regulation. These elements in 
combination allowed the CEO to maintain vigilance, monitor his surroundings, limit amounts of 
information, and ensure information quality. By providing a background of “routine” information and 
opportunities for triangulation and validation, these practices also allowed the CEOs to infer new 
emerging foci of attention.  
To cope with the challenge of fragmentation, CEOs employed careful segmentation by sustaining 
attention until the issue was sufficiently developed to allow it to be either given away or actioned. 
This required applying a degree of simultaneous mono-focal attention on several issues – which we 
describe as a multi-focal orientation. It also required identifying the span of attention needed for 
different topics and deploying a specific combination of practices depending on whether the issue was 
short, medium, or long-term.    
Finally, to address the challenge of variety, the CEOs had to manage the allocation of their attention 
actively, by weeding out certain issues depending on their nature, determining appropriate action, and 
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clearing their desks of other issues to allow prioritization of what they were most concerned about. 
CEOs needed to ensure that their attentional engagement was in line with their personal and 
contextual conditions. Their practices thus continuously evolved and required constant repair. This 
was in response to identification of shortcomings, such as too many issues of little relevance or 
missed problems, or to changes in the institutional landscape.  
We argue that these practices performed an infrastructural function, by operating in the background to 
support the work of the CEOs’ work. They became visible only following breakdown. Moreover, they 
were composed of “humble” elements, relied on what was there before, and prompted a specific 
perspective; all aspects which Star and Ruhleder (1996) consider to be typical of infrastructural 
arrangements.  
By describing these practices as an attentional infrastructure, we highlight also that they are 
interrelated and perform multiple functions. Therefore, it is the entire attentional infrastructure, rather 
than its specific parts, which helps the CEO to address the three challenges we identified. For 
example, the activating and regulating practices, which help CEOs to ignore routines and infer topics 
for attention, also serve a focusing function; the topics serve as the initial focus and prioritization is 
based on the intensity of the trigger. Similarly, some focusing practices help to regulate the number of 
issues the CEOs deals with by allowing them to focus on one particular issue while simultaneously 
continuing to pay attention to other signals.iii Indeed, some function in a regime of lamination, that is, 
they operate at the same time and come together in specific occasions and junctures. Therefore, while 
distinguishing among activating/regulating, focusing, and prioritizing is a useful analytical device, it 
does not wholly reflect the complex, occasionally overlapping nature of observed daily practices.   
  
Contribution to theory 
This paper furthers our understanding of managerial attention by providing one of the first fine-
grained accounts of attentional engagement in relation to the critical challenges faced by CEOs. We 
contribute to work on the ABV in a number of ways. 
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First, we add to scholarship on vigilance and executive attention by showing how managerial attention 
is accomplished. We propose a view of vigilance, scanning, and foresight which is less psychological 
and voluntaristic. Traditionally, vigilance and executive attention are conceived in terms of selective 
allocation of awareness and scanning (Aguilar 1967, Hambrick and Mason 1984, Garg, Walters and 
Priem 2003) and the assumption that what managers pay attention to is linked to their mental 
representations (Starbuck and Milliken 1988). This implies that managers have discretion and are able 
to change the target, frequency, and proactivity of their scanning behaviors (Aguilar 1967, Nag and 
Gioia 2012). Our study provides a more nuanced view. We show that vigilance, scanning, and 
monitoring are the result of infrastructural arrangements which are not entirely within the CEO’s 
immediate sphere of control. What managers pay attention to is thus determined at least in part by the 
attentional infrastructure. This might not be aligned to the CEO’s personal decisions, desires, and 
expectations, and can generate conflict in the CEOs’ attentional engagement practices.  
Second, our findings advance the ABV by shedding light on how managers balance vigilance and 
executive attention through multi-focality and distinct combinations of responses to different temporal 
modes. Our findings question the traditional view that individual attention is inherently sequential while 
organizational attention works as a parallel system (Ocasio 1997). In our study, CEOs emerged as both 
sequential and parallel processors. The critical challenge was how to act as both at the same time: to 
focus without being overwhelmed, and to manage and center on multiple problems of varied durations.  
Third, our study demonstrates that the encounter between the attentional perspective of the firm (i.e. 
the structures that generate heightened awareness and focus) and attentional engagement may be more 
conflicted, fluid, and uncertain than previously thought. Ocasio’s (1997, p.189) observation that 
“while individuals ultimately do the processing … individual attention is situated in the context of the 
firm’s activities and procedures” needs to be revised, since attention emerges necessarily at the 
encounter between the two. In other words, how managerial attention is regulated, sustained, and 
managed emerges at the point where a variety of personal, organizational, and contextual factors 
coincide. Similarly, the ABV argument that attentional engagement refers to the “intentional, 
sustained allocation of cognitive resources” (Ocasio 1997, p. 1288) also needs to be reconsidered. Our 
study suggests that attentional engagement is much less intentional and discretionary than the ABV 
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might suggest, and instead, is the active result of tensions between agency and structure, and between 
aspiration and reality (see Figures 3 and 4). 
Finally, we contribute by addressing some of the undesired effects of the information-processing 
approach underpinning the ABV and most existing research on managerial attention.  First, we 
introduce a material sensibility to the study of attentional processes. While the ABV emphasizes the 
“distributed nature of organizational decisions, actions, and cognitions”, suggesting that “attention is a 
distributed phenomenon” (Ocasio 1997, p. 189-91), it understands this distribution primarily as being 
limited to the cognitive (Ocasio and Joseph 2008, Nigam and Ocasio 2010) and 
communication/linguistic (Ocasio, Laamanen and Vaara 2018) spheres. However, we show that in 
describing engaging attention, the definition must be extended to include artefacts and bundles of 
associated practices. Second, we foreground the potential importance of non-cognitive factors usually 
ignored by the information-processing tradition. Our finding that CEOs work to make room for the 
things they care about, rather than simply making rational calculations, suggests that personal aspects 
such as emotions and preferences also matter. Finally, our study questions the tendency of the 
information-processing approach to downplay the differences derived from unequal positions in 
organizational hierarchies. We show that the nature of CEO attention is determined at least in part by 
the CEO role: some of the attentional engagement practices they employ, such as transferring 
attention, are not available equally to other actors. Thus, our study points to a coincidence between 
attention and formal authority: the lower the hierarchical position, the less the opportunity to sub-
contract attention. Thus, attentional engagement as a set of practices likely varies across different 
roles. While the idea that all managers are monitors remains intuitively valid (Mintzberg 1973), how 
this monitoring is enacted at different levels should be the subject of further empirical research. 
Implications for practice 
Our study has some important implications for practice too. While we observed ‘repairs’ to attentional 
engagement practices, none of the CEOs observed deliberately and regularly interrogated their overall 
coherence – certainly not by asking explicitly “to what and how am I paying attention?”. However, 
lack of attention to attention can become a serious problem, as the breakdowns we observed 
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demonstrated. We found also that practices are performative: unmanaged attentional infrastructures 
and practices ultimately may ‘manage’ the manager. Our empirically-founded theorization could thus 
be employed to interrogate and adjust attentional engagement practices, and diagnose emerging 
difficulties, traps, and pathologies. The starting point is awareness of the composition and functioning 
of the personal attentional infrastructure and the quality of personal attentional engagement practices. 
The next step is straightforwardly to address their balance and potential contradictions.  
In particular, managers might find it useful to adopt the idea of an attentional infrastructure to 
interrogate how they regulate attention. This could involve questions like: what is my infrastructure 
composed of? Do I have the right combination of routines, relationships, and artefacts to allow me to 
stay on top of things and accomplish what I feel I need to do? What does it help me to see? What 
might I be missing and why? What do I need more or less of? It is important that these questions are 
considered frequently and not just in response to a breakdown. Our study shows that ‘paying 
attention’ tended to be considered a routine part of the job, and was not treated as a separate task or a 
skill that required to be maintained. We observed that it was only after some kind of breakdown that a 
repair took place. However, many such breakdowns or their negative consequences might have been 
minimized by regular attention to ‘paying attention’, and the realization that changing work and 
priorities require changes to the attentional infrastructure to ensure a continued ‘fit’. 
Second, managers could use our theorization to interrogate their own maintenance of effective 
attention. Question they might ask include: how attentive do I appear to my collaborators? How 
effective am I at paying attention over different time durations? How effective am I at focusing the 
attention of others? Do the people and processes around me ensure that although I may stop paying 
attention to certain issues, they are taken up by someone else? Getting these things right should ensure 
that issues are not pre-emptively discarded or buried. 
Finally, our theorization could help managers consider the effectiveness of their prioritization 
practices. They might ask: how effective am I at distributing my attention across the things I believe 
matter? Do I tend to be distracted or overtaken by the ‘wrong’ issues in terms of their importance or 
timeliness? Do I pay too much attention or act prematurely without sufficient information? Does my 
distribution of attention reflect personal priorities and beliefs, or is it mostly pre-determined? How can 
38 
 
I regain control of my attention? How effective am I at updating my attentional priorities? Such 
questions should be posed regularly to allow adjustment and avoid breakdowns. 
Directions for future research  
As one of the first ethnographic, practice-oriented explorations of managerial attention, our study 
leaves several critical questions unanswered, opening up opportunities for future research.  
First, while our access was exceptionally comprehensive and our study is one the longest observation-
based scholarly accounts of CEOs, longer observation would have yielded an even richer 
understanding. For example, future research could more closely map how longer-term issues are 
sustained and the triggers that reshape the attention to them over time. As we hint above, a longer 
period of observation would also allow further exploration of the overlaps and interactions among 
practices, and how they work together to produce certain effects. 
Second, the exploratory nature of our study limited our capacity to develop a typology of attentional 
infrastructures and types of attentional engagement. The CEOs used significantly different 
combinations of practices to address the volume, fragmentation, and variety of problems (see Table 1). 
For example, Michael (CEO3) relied on a dense network of relationships built over time and 
supplemented by a sophisticated IT system; he used this to free space for attention to his national and 
international strategic work. In contrast, Jim (CEO7) used social media to make up for his lack of 
long-standing relationships and organizational IT infrastructure. Michael was a fierce “weeder outer” 
of attentional demands, while Jim was a reflector who frequently re-considered his attentional 
priorities. While our data suggest the contours of a typology, our rather small sample does not provide 
sufficient variance for contingency-based theorization. Similarly, despite highlighting the aspect of 
‘fit’ among the demands, constraints, and practices we observed (see also Stewart 1967), we were 
unable to link types of attentional engagement and infrastructures to the effectiveness of the CEOs’ 
practices. Further comparative research is required to establish which practices or bundles of practices 
contribute to effective or ineffective attention engagement, and to identify the conditions for 
situational effectiveness at different times and in different contexts. This would require investigating 
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which attentional profiles ‘fit’ which situations, and whether and how personality traits and personal 
CEO preferences make a difference.  
Third, more investigation is needed to compare attentional engagement at different levels in the 
organization, and in organizations in different industries. Based on the extensive literature on the 
consequences for managerial cognition of different environmental conditions and contextual 
circumstances (Daft, Sormunen and Parks 1988, Garg, Walters and Priem 2003, Sutcliffe 1994), we 
would expect to find different attentional engagement practices and attentional components in 
different social, economic, and cultural conditions.  
Finally, future work could focus more on the non-cognitive aspects determining the content of 
attentional engagement. As the growing literature on the attention economy suggests, affective and 
pre-cognitive factors play a powerful role in attracting attention and determining what we pay 
attention to (Citton 2017).  
Our practice-based study provides a nuanced elaboration of how CEOs perform attentional 
engagement using distinct bundles of practices aimed at activating, regulating, sustaining, and 
managing attention, thus allowing the CEOs’ to cope with challenges of volume, fragmentation, and 
variety. It offers new ways to expand the work of ABV scholars. Our recommendations offer further 
opportunities for meaningful contributions to the literature, which should be useful also to executives. 
Paying (even) more attention to attention is necessary and to be welcomed.   
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i The CEOs engaged in other attentional engagement cycles, e.g. short duration physical actions (i.e. a handshake) and 
reading emails; and longer duration activities, such as career considerations. We do not discuss these here since they 
apply to many employees, whereas we focus on managerial attention. Managers are also increasingly being encouraged 
to consider environmental sustainability, which can be measured in terms of decades and centuries. However, such 
considerations did not seem to occupy the CEOs we observed almost a decade ago. 
ii David worked from home most Wednesday so the average could be slightly higher than for other CEOs – although 4 
meetings seemed to be the norm. Our observation is consistent with previous findings (see e.g. Tengblad 2006). 
iii We are grateful to the Associate Editor, Ann Majchrzak, for pointing this out.  
                                                   
